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 This paper is concerned with the contributions that being in different types of 
relationships with a member of a society should make to an immigrant’s prospects of getting into 
and acquiring membership in that society.  My goal in the paper is to provide considerations of 
political morality, which often diverge in various ways from moral ideals that do not have to be 
implemented within the constraints of actual political societies.  I will focus on feasibility 
constraints that are generated by non-ideal features of our world, such as the fact that most 
societies have limited resources that constrain the overall number of immigrants that they can 
admit in a given period of time.  The morally appropriate treatment of different “unification 
admissions,”1 non-members seeking admission for the purpose of living in the same society with 
members on a stable basis, is the focus of the paper.  I argue that a principled distinction can be 
drawn between unification admissions that societies should treat as legally obligatory to allow in 
and those that societies should treat as legally optional. 
Proponents of the traditional state sovereignty view on immigration, who argue that 
societies have wide latitude in setting their immigration policies, have tended to treat family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This term is borrowed from the more typical term “family reunification,” which is misleading.  
Unification is more apt as a description of the kinds of policies that are discussed under the 
umbrella of family reunification policies because some family members have never lived in the 
same society, or even met one another, and are covered by these policies.  They may still have 
important claims to be able to “unify” in the political sense, living in the same society on the 
stable basis that co-membership affords. 
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reunification as an exception.  For instance, Michael Walzer holds that the powers to control 
admission and exclude prospective newcomers “suggest the deepest meaning of self-
determination.”2  States can only function as self-determining political communities if they can 
take in and refuse immigrants largely as they see fit, and so they must have the right to do so.  
Nevertheless, Walzer holds that it is “especially appropriate”3 for states formed largely by the 
admission of immigrants, such as the United States, to recognize what he calls the “kinship 
principle,” which commits them to giving “priority in immigration to the relatives of citizens.”  
Christopher Heath Wellman also argues for the right of states to exclude.4  For him, this right 
follows from a state’s freedom of association.  Yet because this freedom is ultimately grounded 
in the freedom of association of members of the state, and some members will have important 
interests in associating with family members that can only be fulfilled by bringing these persons 
into the state, Wellman holds that family reunification may be an exception to the state’s right to 
exclude.5 
 Against these theorists, Luara Ferracioli has recently argued that, insofar as societies are 
morally required to prefer family members and spouses of their members seeking to immigrate, 
they must also give the same status to other persons who members bear equally important ties to, 
including friends and creative partners.6  My approach in this paper diverges from both the 
traditional state sovereignty view and Ferracioli’s approach.  I do not hold that societies have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic, 
1983), p. 62. 
3 Ibid., p. 41. 
4 Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, Ethics, Vol. 119, No. 
1 (October 2008), pp. 109-141; Phillip Cole and Christopher Heath Wellman, Debating the 
Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 Cole and Wellman, Debating the Ethics of Immigration, p. 92.  
6 Luara Ferracioli, ‘Family Migration Schemes and Liberal Neutrality: A Dilemma’, Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 5 (2016), pp. 553-575. 
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wide latitude to exclude non-members as they see fit.  However, I disagree with Ferracioli’s 
contention that societies are not morally permitted to treat family members and spouses 
differently from other persons with whom members stand in important relationships.  I will argue 
that there are good reasons to distinguish between family members that societies should take on 
an obligation through their immigration laws and procedures to let in and other unification 
admissions.  While I agree with Ferracioli’s point that on a case-by-case basis there will often be 
friendships and other relationships that match parent-child and marital relationships in 
importance for particular people, this doesn’t yet show that societies must allow for the 
unification of these relationships within their borders.  Nor does the fact that some people are in 
closer relationships with their grandparents than their parents imply that grandparents and 
parents should be treated on a par by actual immigration policy regimes.7  My view supports a 
three-way distinction between non-members in relationships with members who should be 
treated as legally obligatory to let in, those who should be treated as legally optional to let in but 
preferred over general admissions, and those who need not be given any unification admissions 
status. 
 
1. Obligatory and Optional Unification Admissions 
 
 It is more important that some people be allowed to unify in a society than others.  For 
instance, it seems clear that two spouses in a genuine, mature romantic relationship have a 
stronger claim to be able to bring one of them into a society than two other spouses who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 If grandparents played the “parental role” in a person’s life whereas their biological parents did 
not, my view recommends the opposite conclusion.  I clarify what is meant by the parent role 
and how such factors can be accommodated by an immigration policy regime in Section 4. 
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legally still married but no longer romantically involved, all else being equal.  This is all obvious 
so far, but recognizing the variation among potential unification admissions requests raises 
interesting questions for theorists who want to understand what are the morally appropriate 
statuses for societies to give these different requests. 
 Immigration policy regimes must include policies for handling unification admissions, 
which in most countries constitute the largest group of newcomers.8  Immigration officials, 
however, only ever have imperfect information about the veracity and importance of different 
unification requests, an epistemic situation that cannot be overcome entirely by requesting more 
documents, running genetic tests, or conducting more interviews.  How then can theorists 
working in the ethics of immigration draw distinctions between different unification admissions 
requests and understand whether immigration policies of existing societies that distinguish 
between such requests are morally defensible? 
 The non-members who are given some preferential treatment by a society’s immigration 
policy regime on the basis that they are in some type of relationship with an existing member of 
the society are, for my purposes, the persons that society recognizes as unification admissions.  
My view is that a principled distinction can be drawn between two recognized categories of 
unification admissions, and also a third category of unification admissions that a society does not 
recognize in any official way.  “Obligatory unification admissions,” as I will refer to them, are 
unification admissions that the society takes on a legal obligation to allow in.  By contrast, 
“optional unification admissions” are given some extra consideration as compared to the general 
pool of immigrants but the society does not take on a legal obligation to admit them.  The terms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World, 5th edn (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 
p. 7; OECD, ‘A Portrait of Family Migration in OECD Countries’, in International Migration 
Outlook 2017 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017). 
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“obligatory” and “optional” as I use them in this paper are shorthand for “legally obligatory” and 
“legally optional” unless otherwise specified.  The position that I will spend most of the paper 
arguing for is that certain unification admissions should be placed into the legal category of the 
persons whom a society is required to take in under its immigration laws, the obligatory 
unification admissions.  Granting this legal status to certain unification admissions does not 
make it the case that they cannot be refused under any circumstances.  If a non-member is a 
terrorist or is found to be carrying a contagious disease the transmission of which could create a 
public health emergency, to give some examples, they may still be refused despite having this 
status.  Obligatory unification admissions are persons who must be allowed in unless some very 
pressing reasons can be given for keeping them out.  Other reasons for excluding them, such as 
that there are too many other immigrants seeking to get in through another category, are taken 
off the table.  By contrast, optional unification admissions here are persons whom a society has 
the option to exclude even without very pressing reasons.  Optional admissions may be excluded 
because there are too many immigrants from another category seeking to enter that the society 
wishes to bring in, for instance.  As I said, there may also be other unification admissions, non-
members seeking to unify with a member of a society whom the society need not treat differently 
from general admissions.  I will focus predominantly on the first category in this paper and 
which unification admissions should be placed in it, but I will also say a bit about the second and 
third categories and how they might be separated from one another. 
 As Ferracioli emphasizes with numerous examples, actual relationships vary across types 
in their importance for particular persons.9  A friendship may be especially important to someone 
given their rich history with a friend and the ways in which they’ve supported one another over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ferracioli, ‘Family Migration Schemes and Liberal Neutrality: A Dilemma.’ 
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time.  A creative partnership may also be of special value in a person’s life that is not obviously 
of lesser value than their relationships with other persons.  We cannot reliably draw any 
conclusions about the strength of the bond between two people from the fact that they are in a 
parent-child, marital, sibling, or another type of relationship with one another.  This is plausibly 
true, although it leaves open the question of whether the ideal forms or best instances of each 
type of relationship might differ in their moral significance.  Even if this were the case, however, 
there is a further constraint that liberal democracies recognize, which Ferracioli refers to as the 
constraint of “liberal neutrality.”10  This is the requirement that liberal societies refrain from 
implementing laws and institutional arrangements that are justified by reference to conceptions 
of the good that are subject to reasonable disagreement.  I will return to the constraint of liberal 
neutrality after presenting my view and show that it does not violate this constraint. 
 
2. Obligatory Unification Admissions 
 
 What could make it the case that certain persons that members of a society are in 
important relationships with should be treated as obligatory unification admissions?  It has 
become standard in the ethics of immigration literature to consider the weightiness of interests 
that either support or fail to support unification schemes.11  It will also be useful in putting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., p. 554.  
11 Ferracioli distinguishes between strong and weak interests in this context (Ibid., pp. 563-564).  
Joseph Carens uses the term “vital interests” in his discussion of family reunification (see Joseph 
Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 185-191).  
Matthew Lister refers to “important interests” in reunification in his discussion of the 
requirement to give equal access to family reunification to heterosexual and homosexual married 
couples (see Matthew Lister, ‘A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based Immigration 
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples’, The University of Memphis Law Review, Vol. 37 (Summer 
2007), pp. 745-780). 
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forward my view of the justification for these schemes and the shape that they should take to 
distinguish between fundamental interests and non-fundamental interests.  Fundamental interests, 
as I will understand them, are interests whose fulfilment is important to an agent’s having a 
meaningful and worthwhile life.  Non-fundamental interests, by contrast, are interests the 
fulfilment of which is not important in this way.  I hold that one of the fundamental interests of 
persons is the interest in participating in and maintaining certain close relationships with other 
persons.  This claim does not entail that the fulfilment of this interest is either sufficient or 
necessary for having a meaningful and worthwhile life.  In terms of sufficiency, surely other 
interests must be fulfilled for one to have such a life, including many very mundane subsistence-
based interests in being nourished, having shelter, and so on.  Perhaps some of these should be 
singled out as “basic interests,” because their fulfilment is required for physical survival, but this 
doesn’t require us to deny that other interests are fundamental in the intended sense.  Which 
other interests must be fulfilled to give one a meaningful and worthwhile life is an interesting 
philosophical question that I cannot address here.12  In terms of necessity, it may be that a life 
could be meaningful and worthwhile, in at least some cases, even in the absence of these 
particularly close relationships with other persons if enough other important interests are 
fulfilled.  One would expect that the life of a reclusive monk could be very meaningful and 
worthwhile, even if not the kind of life that the vast majority of people would choose for 
themselves.  But in typical cases people require certain close relationships with other persons to 
sustain a meaningful and worthwhile existence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For an important recent attempt to address the question of what is involved in living a 
meaningful life, see Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
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 Two points are then worth noting, one of which I have just discussed.  The first is that 
certain relationships with other persons are typically important parts of a meaningful and 
worthwhile life.  Normally, we think of certain family and romantic relationships as constituting 
an important class of such relationships.  People have fundamental interests in participating in 
and maintaining these relationships with others.  The second is that these relationships can be 
composed of members and non-members of given societies.  Indeed, given the freedom of 
movement and exit afforded to members of modern democratic societies, their members may be 
more likely, in general, than members of other societies that limit movement and exit more 
systematically to participate in these relationships with non-members.  I will sometimes refer to 
relationships that members of a society stand in with non-members of that society as “external 
relationships.”13 
 A third point is that sometimes these fundamental interest of persons can only be fulfilled 
by a society allowing some non-members to immigrate.  For instance, a member of society may 
have an elderly parent that they can only participate in and maintain their relationship with by 
bringing them into their society on the stable basis that membership makes possible.  They might 
not be able to join their parent’s society if that society has very strict immigration rules.  
Alternatively, if the member is gay and gay people face violent discrimination in the society 
where their parent lives, they may not be able to move there without taking on very serious risks.  
To take another example, a parent who is a member of society that has been separated from their 
children who do not currently have membership may need to bring their children into the society 
on the stable basis that membership affords them.  Otherwise, this member may not be able to 
continue to provide a secure developmental environment and care for them in the ways required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Matthew Lindauer, ‘Immigration Policy and Identification Across Borders’, Journal of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2017), pp. 280-303. 
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by their parental duties.  Spouses who have been separated from one another may also need to 
unify in the society where one spouse is a member in order to continue to participate in and 
maintain their relationship with one another.  Relationships may require unification in a society 
when the parties to them cannot unify, or cannot do so without taking on unreasonable risks and 
costs, in another society. 
 
3. Obligatory Unification Admissions and Feasibility Constraints 
 
 I noted earlier that a case-by-case assessment shows that there are many types of 
relationships that can be very important to us and there is no necessary connection between a 
given relationship’s type and how important it is to the people in it.  Unfortunately, however, 
societies face a number of practical hurdles to treating all persons in important relationships with 
their members as obligatory unification admissions.  According to Ferracioli’s view, the 
differential treatment given to these relationships violates the requirement of liberal neutrality.  
But this conclusion, I will argue, ignores a set of important feasibility constraints that societies 
face when implementing unification admissions policies.14 
 From the perspective of desirability, it is natural to think that states ought to treat all 
external relationships that are equally important to the people in them equally.15  It would be a 
good thing to do this if and when it is practically possible and there is a moral cost to not doing 
so; people who stand in important relationships with one another are not granted the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I am grateful to Nic Southwood for helpful discussion on the role that feasibility 
considerations play in my argument. 
15 On the contrast between desirability and feasibility, see Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, 
‘Introduction’, in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. Robert E. Goodin 
and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 
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treatment as other people in relationships that are equally important for them.  However, it is 
widely held that considerations of feasibility, in addition to desirability, should inform the policy 
proposals that we put forward as political philosophers.  The concept of feasibility is becoming 
an important topic in its own right in political philosophy, particularly in discussions surrounding 
the ideal/non-ideal theory debate.16  Feasibility considerations, I hold, are an important part of 
the explanation of why states are justified in using category-based systems for unification 
admissions and not judging external relationships on a case-by-case basis. 
 Of course, there are many different kinds of considerations that involve feasibility, and 
not all of these should count against a particular view on immigration policy.17  For instance, the 
fact that states and their citizens aren’t motivated to adopt a given policy is not a reason in favor 
of a competing policy, even though this fact increases the likelihood that the second policy will 
be adopted rather than the first.18  This is not the kind of consideration that I will appeal to in 
arguing for a category-based scheme over a case-by-case scheme of the kind envisioned by 
Ferracioli.  Nor do I think that any of the “hard constraints of” logical, conceptual, metaphysical, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Goodin and Pettit, ‘Introduction’; Juha Räikkä, ‘The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1998), pp. 27-40; Geoffrey Brennan and Philip 
Pettit, ‘The Feasibility Issue’, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, eds. Frank 
Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 258-279; Pablo 
Gilabert, ‘Feasibility and Socialism’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011), pp. 
52-63; Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, ‘Political Feasibility: A Conceptual 
Exploration’, Political Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2012), pp. 809-825; Holly Lawford-Smith, 
‘Understanding Political Feasibility’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2013), pp. 
243-259; David Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); David Wiens, ‘Political Ideals and the Feasibility Frontier’, 
Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2015), pp. 447-477. 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify which types of feasibility 
considerations are and are not relevant in this context. 
18 Lawford-Smith, ‘Understanding Political Feasibility’, p. 256. 
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or nomological impossibility rule out such an approach.19  As opposed to hard feasibility 
constraints, which make it the case that an outcome cannot obtain, “soft feasibility constraints” 
are facts that make an outcome less likely to obtain.  It is soft constraints that are typically 
discussed in political philosophy and that are thought to be relevant to the assessment of policies 
and political principles.  Unlike hard constraints, soft constraints are not absolute, and so it is 
compatible with changing conditions that their import on a given political issue may change.  
There is reason to think, however, that a set of important soft constraints render a case-by-case 
system infeasible for the foreseeable future, and this fact helps to explain why a category-based 
system need not violate the principle of liberal neutrality. 
 First, even very large societies that are low in population density may not be able to take 
in all the persons who want to come in a given year.  If they are meeting their domestic justice 
responsibilities, they must use public resources to support their members in various ways, such 
as through the provision of public healthcare and unemployment benefits.  They must also 
extend equal protection of the law to all members, which involves distributing resources to 
courts, police, and public defenders, among other legal entities.20  Given these resource 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 On the contrast between hard and soft constraints of feasibility, see Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith, ‘Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration’, and Lawford-Smith, ‘Understanding 
Political Feasibility’. 
20 Michael Blake, ‘Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 41, No. 2 (2013), pp. 103-130.  Notably, immigration courts often face much greater 
burdens than others.  As of April 2017, the backlog of immigration cases in the United States 
waiting for a decision reached an all-time high of 585,930 cases, with individuals waiting an 
average of 670 days for their case to be heard, according to Syracuse University’s TRAC 
Immigration Project (see http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/468/, accessed September 20, 2017).  A 2010 American Bar Association report found that 
immigration judges in the U.S. receive an average of roughly 1,250 new cases per year, 
approximately 550 more cases than federal judges hearing social security or veteran law cases.  
See American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: 
Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the 
Adjudication of Removal Cases, 2010, 
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constraints and the numerical limits on how many people can be taken in that they give rise to, 
there is potential competition among different types of admissions.  This is not to say that all 
countries will necessarily have to impose limits on immigration.  When these constraints are not 
applicable, as I have noted above, it would be best to allow all persons in morally significant 
relationships with members in.  But there is substantial evidence that societies typically do face 
these constraints.21  As a result, they must adopt priorities for the different streams of migrants 
that they will take in, and increasing allowances for one stream, such as unification admissions, 
can reduce the number of migrants that can be taken in through another stream.22 
 Most societies do not experience only one type of migration pressure, but are subject 
instead to what is often referred to as “differentiation of migration” – a range of different types 
of admissions including family members, skilled workers, and asylum seekers.23  Notably, family 
reunion, in particular the entry of dependent children, spouses, and other relatives of previous 
primary migrants, remains the largest entry category in many countries.24  Societies that already 
face great demands to bring in family members often have responsibilities to bring in other 
persons.  In many cases, they have asylum seekers arriving and claiming refugee status that they 
have moral and international legal obligations to use resources to take in and determine the status 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_ 
complete_full_report.pdf, accessed September 20, 2017. 
21 See Anna Boucher, Gender, Migration, and the Global Race for Talent (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2016); OECD, ‘Trends in International Migration’, SOPEMI 2006 
Annual Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006); OECD, ‘A Portrait of Family Migration in 
OECD Countries’; and Elaine Chao and Arnold Levine, ‘Integrating Immigrants Into the 
Workforce: North American and European Experiences’, Bureau of International Labor Affairs 
U.S.-E.U. Papers, July 28-29, 2004. 
22 Boucher, Gender, Migration, and the Global Race for Talent, p. 69; OECD, ‘Trends in 
International Migration’, pp. 112-125. 
23 Castles, de Haas, and Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World, p. 16. 
24 Castles, de Haas, and Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World, p. 7; OECD, ‘A Portrait of Family Migration in OECD Countries’. 
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of.  Further, to avoid being disadvantaged in the global economy they must often leave room for 
some skilled workers and their families to come and join their leading universities, corporations, 
and other “centers of excellence.”25  If societies that set annual limits on immigration were 
morally obligated to allow in every cousin or friend of every one of their members, less room 
would be available for other inflows.26  It would be more difficult for them to fulfill their other 
immigration-related responsibilities, such as taking in asylum seekers requesting refugee status, 
and bring in skilled workers, which in many cases benefits the sending and receiving societies,27 
if unification admissions significantly increased. 
 To put the point slightly differently, a state’s immigration policy regime should be set up 
not only so as to maximally satisfy people’s fundamental interests in unifying with others.  It 
must also answer to the state’s other immigration-related responsibilities, such as the duty to take 
in refugees.  In doing so, a feasible immigration policy regime will avoid “making the best the 
enemy of the good.”  I acknowledge that the best possible immigration policy regime would take 
in all refugees seeking asylum, allow all persons to immigrate who stand in morally significant 
relationships with citizens, and still allow for labor migration to support important collaborative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I am grateful to Steve Darwall for pointing out the relationship between centers of excellence 
and skilled migration. 
26 See Boucher, Gender, Migration, and the Global Race for Talent, pp. 69-93, for an important 
discussion of the ways in which family migration and asylum seekers compete with other 
admissions.  Boucher also discusses the similar measures that were taken in Australia and 
Canada in the late twentieth century to restrict family admissions in order to increase skilled 
worker admissions.  For the competition between skilled and family migration in the United 
States, see Gerry Mackie, ‘U.S. Immigration Policy and Local Justice’, in Local Justice in 
America, ed. Jon Elster (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), pp. 227-290.  See also 
OECD, ‘Trends in International Migration’, pp. 112-125. 
27 See Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), Christian Barry, ‘Immigration and Global Justice’, Global Justice: Theory, Practice, and 
Rhetoric, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2011), pp. 30-38, and Gillian Brock and Michael Blake, Debating Brain 
Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) for 
competing moral assessments of developed societies accepting skilled workers from developing 
societies. 
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research and corporate ventures.  But doing all of these things, the empirical evidence suggests, 
would be infeasible for most existing societies, and so a balance must be struck that properly 
responds to the human interests and claims involved.  Here I am holding fixed a few 
commitments that Ferracioli and I share, in particular the duties of states to take in refugees and, 
presumably, the permission of states to bring in at least some skilled workers.  With these fixed 
points, I am then considering the shape that a unification admissions policy should take, subject 
to the first resource-based feasibility constraint just discussed. 
 Second, as Ferracioli acknowledges at one point, a state must often make use of clear-cut, 
objective criteria in implementing its immigration policies.28  Using clear-cut, publicly-known 
criteria has important benefits over a system that relies too heavily on the discretion of officials.  
It reduces the amount of resources that go into immigration administration and lag in the system, 
both problems that existing societies often struggle with.29  Clear guidelines for unification 
admissions will also do a better job of realizing the aim of unification policies, fulfilling the 
interests of persons in unifying, because citizens and non-citizens who stand in important 
relationships with one another can anticipate the results of their unification requests in advance 
to a greater extent.  These are fundamental or strong interests of theirs, and being able to apply 
for unification with clear guidelines about how to go about doing so and what to expect is 
therefore especially useful to them.  Further, drawing on the importance of the interests involved 
in unification, clear-cut, general, and public guidelines rely less heavily on the discretion of 
immigration officials in determining whether or not people are allowed to live in the same state.  
With weighty interests of this kind, it is more important to avoid false negatives, preventing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ferracioli, ‘Family Migration Schemes and Liberal Neutrality: A Dilemma’, p. 574, note 34. 
29 Castles, de Haas, and Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World. 
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people who are genuinely in these important relationships from unifying, than false positives, 
allowing some people who aren’t genuinely in these relationships to do so.  While some 
discretion will have to be involved in assessing whether or not claims are fraudulent, as in the 
case of interviews for people who are seeking to unify as spouses, it is best to give clear 
guidelines that limit the discretion of individual immigration officials when such important 
interests are at play.  So a category-based system will also be more feasible than a case-by-case 
system in virtue of providing clear-cut, objective criteria that rely less on the discretion of 
officials assessing unification admissions requests. 
 Third, states must avoid implementing unification policies that make it difficult to detect 
fraudulent claims.  Because people admitted through unification policies, as noted earlier, use 
societal resources and compete with other prospective newcomers for limited offers of 
admission, it is important that their claims be genuine and that the state have means to reliably 
assess the authenticity of their ties to an insider.  Of course, reliability does not imply infallibility 
in assessing these claims, which is an impossibly high standard that would prevent all external 
relationships from being recognized for immigration purposes.  But the use of categories that 
pick out external relationships that are reasonably verifiable and more difficult to fake will be 
more feasible for an immigration policy regime than assessing relationships on a case-by-case 
basis.  I will say more about verifiability and the ability to detect fraudulent relationships in the 
following sections, where I compare potential categories of unification admissions.  The point to 
make at this stage is that categories allow immigration policy regimes to set unification 
admissions policies that focus on relationships that generally can be verified and that are difficult 
to fake, making it more feasible for a society to bring in unification admissions while still 
meeting its other immigration-related responsibilities. 
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 There is a tension, then, between the case-by-case approach and acknowledging the 
feasibility constraints that actual societies are generally subject to when administering their 
immigration policies.  This tension provides a prima facie justification for seeing whether the 
practice that societies typically engage in of distinguishing between different relationships in 
their immigration policies could be justified.  We approach this question fully aware that there 
are moral costs in not being able to take on a legal obligation to bring in every person that is in a 
morally significant relationship with a member of society.  The persons whom we treat as legally 
obligatory unification admissions, on this approach, are a subset of those whom we would be 
morally obligated to let in if we didn’t face the feasibility constraints just discussed.  A society is 
morally obligated to implement an immigration policy regime that takes these factors into 
account and uses clear-cut, practically feasible rules that give appropriate consideration to the 
fundamental interests of, at least, all its members.30  This does not, however, imply that all 
members can have their fundamental interests in bringing people in fulfilled by these 
arrangements. 
 Which non-members, then, should be treated as obligatory unification admissions?  I 
argue that, roughly, they are parents, children, and spouses of members.  I will start by 
discussing parents and children, by which I meant to include parents and non-adult unmarried 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I will say more about the interests of members and non-members below, and how a clearer 
understanding of the interests at stake in implementing different kinds of unification schemes is 
important for the justification of categories of unification admissions. 
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4. Parents and Non-Adult Unmarried Children 
 
 Although not all people have especially close relationships with their parents, in typical 
cases parents are among the other people whom we value most and bear the closest ties to in our 
lives.  In usual circumstances, parents raise their biological children and play the crucial role in 
securing the conditions under which they grow and become adults.  Parents provide for our 
moral education and encourage us to develop our own moral agency.31  The love of parents, 
which is often thought of as unconditional, can help to create a stable disposition towards self-
respect in a child.  Parents help us to make decisions about our futures and become the persons 
we want to be.  It is not at all surprising that people whose parents fulfill these functions, which 
are often thought of as parental duties,32 come to value their relationships with their parents as 
some of the most important ones in their lives.  Parents typically fulfill these unique roles in their 
children’s lives, and children’s ties to their parents are made especially strong in a lasting way as 
a result.33  A parent often provides a supportive anchor in life than is not equaled in other 
relationships.  I emphasize these considerations to highlight some of the features that make 
parent-child relationships strong, distinctive, and irreplaceable.34  No other relationship involves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 J. David Velleman, ‘Beyond Price’, Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 2 (January 2008), pp. 191-212. 
32 Perhaps some of these are more demanding than what is morally required, but engaging in this 
debate would go beyond the bounds of this paper. 
33 Notably, each of these roles just mentioned can be fulfilled by adoptive parents, stepparents, or 
other members of the family whom societies make eligible to adopt or attain legal custody over 
the child.  In these cases, a child may become far closer to other persons who play the parental 
role in their lives just described, involving nurturing and helping them to develop into an adult, 
than their biological parents.  My use of the term ‘parent’ is intended to capture all of these 
persons. 
34 My strategy here is to appeal to commonly accepted features of different human relationships 
to show that we may draw a principled distinction between different unification admissions.  
While I offer one line of reasoning in support of the claim that members have standing to 
demand that their society allow them to bring in certain non-members, this claim is not in dispute 
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the same expectations of nearly unconditional love and support that parents are supposed to have 
for their children. 
 Given these features, it is often the case that people see themselves as having important 
responsibilities to their parents as adults.  Aging parents often require care and emotional support 
through the later stages of life.  While other persons may be able to provide this care, their adult 
children often will want to do so insofar as they are able, reciprocating the support that they 
received from their parents during their childhoods.  Additionally, adult children will want to be 
able to spend time with the parent as they approach the end of their life.  If someone has moved 
to another country for career or other personal reasons, it may be very hard for them to continue 
their new located life-plans, involving personal and professional responsibilities that must be 
fulfilled there,35 while remaining without their parent. 
 These points support the view that people typically have a fundamental interest in 
participating in and maintaining close relationships with their parents.  In circumstances where a 
member of society cannot without great cost immigrate to another society where their parent 
lives, this interest will be frustrated if their parent cannot immigrate to their own society.  And in 
many cases, it will be urgent that parents be allowed in at later stages in their lives, when they 
have limited time remaining to spend and be cared for by their families.  If the parent lives in a 
society where their adult children could not live safely, for instance a society where gay people 
are at risk of violent attacks when their child is gay, the response that the child could just move 
to their parent’s society simply won’t do.  As a member of society, their children may also have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
between Ferracioli and I.  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify the 
relation of this claim to my overall argument. 
35 I borrow the term “located life-plan” from Anna Stilz.  See Anna Stilz, ‘Occupancy Rights and 
the Wrongs of Removal’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2013), pp. 324-356.  
Stilz intends for the term to capture situated goals, relationships, and projects. 
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found important projects that support their livelihood or started a family of their own that they 
cannot leave. 
 People usually have a maximum of two legal parents in modern democratic societies, and 
it is fairly easy to verify in most cases, through either DNA tests or legal documents, that 
someone is your parent.  So there is little risk of overburdening immigration quotas or overtaxing 
societal resources by allowing members to bring in their parents.  Giving obligatory unification 
admissions status to parents is perfectly compatible with having a feasible immigration policy 
regime that meets its other immigration-related responsibilities. 
 Summing up, parents are some of the people that we are often the closest to in our lives.  
But additionally, it is often important to be able to bring a parent into one’s society, especially at 
certain stages of their lives, to continue to participate in and maintain one’s relationship with 
them.  Further, because people usually have only two parents and parental relationships are 
relatively easy to verify, allowing members of society to bring in their parents does not bump up 
against the feasibility constraints discussed in Section 3.36  These are three plausible 
considerations that speak in favor of giving obligatory unification admissions status to parents as 
part of a feasible immigration policy regime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It is worth noting that existing unification schemes typically only grant obligatory unification 
status to the parents of adult members of society.  I will flag the point here that there may be 
good reasons to limit obligatory unification admissions status to parents of adult members of 
society in societies that use jus soli or “birthright citizenship” in order to avoid creating perverse 
incentives to have children in these societies to gain citizenship for oneself.  Although this 
problem does not exist in the U.S. currently, despite the public rhetoric surrounding “anchor 
babies” from some quarters, it is one that a society may legitimately avoid creating.  However, 
this does not imply that it is morally permissible to keep these parents out entirely, to treat them 
as general admissions, or to deport them if they are present in the country illegally and have 
committed no serious crimes.  A fuller discussion of this interesting and practically important 
issue would go beyond the purview of this paper.  The considerations above should be taken to 
apply to at least parents of adult members of society. 
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 The next group of admissions that should be placed in the obligatory unification 
admissions category are children, specifically non-adult unmarried children, of members of 
society.37  Some of the points that I will make here also add to the support for the claim that 
parents should be treated as obligatory unification admissions.  My view is that the interests of 
members in bringing in their parents are strong enough to generate an obligation on the state to 
admit parents, given the absence of feasibility considerations that militate against doing so.  But 
the fact that non-member parents often have strong interests in being in the same societies as 
their children provides further support for the claim that they should be allowed to immigrate to 
the societies where their children live.  However, societies are only obligated to allow people to 
bring in their children, I hold, when these children have not reached adulthood or started a family 
of their own by getting married.  I will say why this restriction should be used shortly, but will 
first discuss the reasons why I hold that non-adult unmarried children should be allowed in. 
 I mentioned earlier that children often seek to reciprocate the care that their parents 
provided for them early in life as a reason for allowing parents to immigrate and live in the same 
society as their adult children.  Implicit in this point is the prior fact that parents typically care 
for their children in distinctive and important ways.  People who put in the effort of parenting 
children typically take on costs to themselves in doing so by restricting the financial and other 
resources they have to pursue other interests.  They typically become invested in the child’s 
future and seek to help them to develop into full adults.  There are interests that people who take 
on the parenting role develop in caring for and supporting their children.  Additionally, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 As in the case of parents, my discussions of the considerations that favor placing non-adult 
unmarried children of members in the obligatory unification admissions category is intended to 
include adopted children and stepchildren. 
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may be general interests in parenting that all human beings possess,38 but this view is 
controversial and difficult to reconcile with the fact that many people live what seem to be very 
meaningful and worthwhile lives without having or raising children.  What is uncontroversial is 
that people who already have or are raising children often have important interests in maintaining 
close relationships with them. 
 If all of this is right, why would parents ever wind up having to bring in their children 
from abroad, rather than merely staying in the same society as them?  There are a number of 
ways in which this can happen.  Parents and their children are sometimes separated while 
escaping political conflicts39 or other events, such as natural disasters, in their home country.  In 
other cases, job opportunities arise in a new society where a given parent or set of parents must 
immigrate to improve the livelihoods of themselves and their children.  If they are accepted, 
these parents as new members of society have a strong interest in being able to continue to raise 
and nurture the development of their children that the new society should recognize by allowing 
the children to immigrate.40 
 Relatedly, there are many examples of people, usually women, in poor countries who 
have been abandoned by their spouses and left having to provide for their children alone.  
Sometimes these mothers have parents to call on to help with raising the children while they 
work.  But often the amount of money that a single woman can make, for instance, in a small 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), for one recent attempt to argue for 
this view. 
39 This has happened with many families fleeing the conflict in Syria.  See Lizzie Dearden, 
‘Refugee Crisis: Lost Children Being Split from Parents Left “Vulnerable to Trafficking and 
Abuse”’, The Independent, September 10, 2015, http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-lost-children-being-split-from-parents-left-vulnerable-
to-trafficking-and-abuse-10494331.html, accessed March 26, 2017. 
40 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify that my point is meant to 
apply once a parent becomes a member of the new society. 
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rural town in Mexico is not enough to provide for their children on a sustainable basis even with 
the help of grandparents.41  These women do not want to leave their children behind – the choice 
is often excruciatingly difficult for them to make.  It is out of love for their children and a 
broader acknowledgment of what they will need to flourish and develop into adults that mothers 
travel to richer countries to find work.  For some years they send fund homes but long to have 
the chance to bring their children into the more prosperous society, and depend on the income 
they make in the new society to sustain their family.  My claim is not that states are morally 
required to take in these parents, but instead that if these parents go through the process of 
becoming citizens, they should be allowed to bring their children into the new society.42  By 
doing so, the society will give appropriate consideration to their fundamental interest in 
participating in and maintaining their relationships with their children. 
 So far I have spoken to the closeness of the parent-child relationship from the parent’s 
perspective and the importance of being able to bring one’s children into the society that one is a 
member of.  What of feasibility?  My view is that by restricting the group of children of 
members that are obligatory unification admissions to non-adult unmarried children, a society 
can take in these children of members while meeting its other immigration-related 
responsibilities.  There are two important considerations that favor this restriction.  First, a 
society that was obligated to bring in all the children of its members would be required to accept 
long chains of immigrants who may want to enter, and such “chain migration” would constraint 
the number of the remaining immigrants from other groups that the society could bring in.  A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This case resembles the kind discussed by Leah Schmalzbauer at https://www.ncfr.org/ ncfr-
report/focus/immigration-migration/migration-separation-and-family-survival, accessed April 
28, 2015.  See also her The Last Best Place?: Gender, Family, and Migration in the New West 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
42 This is compatible with there being other reasons to let the children immigrate even if the 
parent has violated some immigration laws or didn’t acquire full citizenship. 
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member of society with three adult children that themselves have two children each, for instance, 
would have the ability to put the society under an obligation to bring in nine people according to 
such a rule.  One can see how quickly larger numbers per member could be generated if children 
of members were treated as an unrestricted group in the obligatory unification admissions 
category.  This could easily jeopardize the society’s ability to meet its other immigration-related 
responsibilities, both in terms of other obligatory unification admissions and any other groups, 
such as refugees, that must be admitted. 
 The second consideration in support of this restriction refers back to the importance of 
bringing in one’s children.  Adult and married children of members of society are typically past 
the point where their development as individuals should be significantly impacted by whether or 
not their parents live in the same society as they do.  While parents often remain a strong source 
of guidance and advice throughout life, the interests of a parent in caring for and remaining 
closely involved in their child’s life while he or she is developing into an adult becomes less 
significant as the child matures into adulthood.43  If they marry, they start a family of their own, 
which may or may not come to include children.  The parent who is a member of society will 
likely still want to be a part of their lives, but the same caring and supporting relation does not 
obtain as the child becomes an adult and, if they do so, gets married.  Caring relations in the 
other direction may obtain, of course, as I discussed earlier, where children seek to care for their 
parents.  I don’t deny that members of society may have interests in being cared for by their adult 
and married children.  Given the fact that treating all adult and married children as obligatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I’m not certain of how to treat the issue of unification when a child has a severe developmental 
disorder that prevents them from acquiring the cognitive abilities to live as independent adults.  
I’m inclined to say that in these cases, they should be treated as obligatory unification admissions 
as it is often very important for both the parents and the child to continue to live together and not 
practically infeasible for most societies to allow for this limited additional flow of immigrants. 
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unification admissions would be likely to render an immigration policy regime infeasible, 
appropriate consideration to these interests is compatible with not giving adult and married 
children this status.  However, the interests of members in living with their adult and married 
children, both for their children’s sake and their own, do provide some reason for the society to 




 The last group of non-members that should be treated as obligatory unification 
admissions are spouses of members.  I am also committed to the claim that societies must let in 
people who are about to be married to a member, but the issue of which non-members are 
obligatory unification admissions pertains to who must be not only let in but also allowed to 
become a member of society.  In this section, I will argue for considerations in favor of 
obligatory unification admissions status for current spouses of members.44 
 The relationship between two spouses is typically of special importance in their lives.  
Because we have the ability to choose whether or not to develop a romantic relationship with 
another person, mature romantic relationships can provide value in our lives that is rarely found 
elsewhere.  Finding that someone else whom we wish to commit to as our romantic and domestic 
partner reciprocates those desires and commitments with us can provide a unique kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I do not have the space here to extend these points to the provision of marriage visas for 
fiancé(e)s of members.  I will note here, however, that with a few restrictions, such as the 
requirement that the member and their fiancé(e) who has been brought in get married within a 
certain period of time (90 days for the “K-1 visa” in the United States), marriage visas can be 
part of a feasible immigration policy regime. 
 25 
affirmation, lifting our self-esteem and bolstering our confidence.45  When such relationships 
continue and flourish over time, the bonds between persons deepen and they are able to help one 
another through difficult experiences, while also sharing in their positive experiences.46  
Marriage is not a perfect criterion for establishing that such a deep and mutually rewarding bond 
exists, but it provides a civic form of recognition for relationships between persons that are often 
especially valuable to them. 
 Why then is spousal unification ever necessary for a couple?  As noted in the prior 
discussions of parents and children, people sometimes become separated during political 
conflicts or other events where they cannot escape to the same place.  Additionally, one spouse’s 
society may have very restrictive immigration rules that would prevent the other from getting in.  
There are also forms of discrimination that some romantic partners would face in many societies.  
In the case of marriages between homosexual or interracial couples, in particular, it may be the 
case that the couple would be subject to discrimination in the society where one of them lives.  
Even in places where they are legally able to marry, it may not be the case that they could safely 
live together.  Lastly, sometimes one spouse must move to a new society to pursue professional 
or personal opportunities, or to take care of a family member.  Here again, my claim is not that a 
society is, in every case, obligated to admit the first spouse arriving.  As I have argued in the case 
of parent-child relationships, the point is that members have standing to demand that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This should not be taken to imply that unrequited love cannot be valuable.  For an interesting 
defense of the value of unrequited love, see Sara Protasi, ‘Loving People for Who They Are 
(Even When They Don’t Love You Back)’, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 4 
(2014), pp. 214-234. 
46 See Robert Nozick, ‘Love’s Bond’, in The Examined Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1989), pp. 68-86.  Nozick argues that mature romantic love involves the formation of a “we” by 
two people, a “new entity created by a new web of relationships between them which makes 
them no longer separate” (p. 70).  I am not committed to Nozick’s view, but part of what it 
attempts to capture is the shared experience of joy and sadness that mature romantic love brings. 
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society allow them to bring in persons to whom they are particularly close if it would be feasible 
to do so.  The society would violate their fundamental interests as persons in participating in and 
maintaining particularly close relationships with other persons by keeping their spouses out, 
which is unacceptable in the absence of a compelling reason to do so. 
 Of course, some spouses are denied the chance to unify and still manage to stay married.  
One such case was that of Nobel Prize winner, democratic activist, and first State Counsellor of 
Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi and Michael Aris.47  During the ten-year period when she was 
placed under house arrest and leading up to Aris’ death they only saw each other five times, with 
the last time being over three years before he passed away.  I want to urge that despite their 
ability to remain married, Suu Kyi and Aris were wronged by being prevented from unifying.  
Their fundamental interests in participating in and maintaining their marital relationship were 
ignored by the Burmese government, among other interests of hers. 
 In some cases, spousal unification will also be important for the non-adult children of 
members, whom I’ve already argued should be treated as obligatory unification admissions.  If a 
married couple consisting of a member and a non-member have children that are to be brought 
into the member’s society, the children should not be denied the chance to live with both parents 
there.  Most societies do not grant non-adult children who are members the ability to bring in 
parents as unification admissions, so the only unification request that could bring this person in 
would come from the parent who is a member in such societies.  Even if one thinks that existing 
societies should do more to help children who are members unify with their parents who are non-
members, the children will need representatives in such proposals to petition to bring in their 
parents.  In practice, such measures will require coordination between representatives of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I am grateful to Steve Darwall for mentioning this case to me. 
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children and the state, and will not be the quickest route for bringing in these parents.  It will be 
greatly advantageous for these children, even if such policies are implemented, for their parents 
who are members to be able to bring in the other parent through marriage-based unification 
admissions. 
 In addition to the closeness of the relationship that spouses can have with one another and 
the importance of spousal unification, feasibility constraints do not militate against including 
spouses within the category of obligatory unification admissions.  First, each member will only 
bring at most one spouse at a given time into a liberal democracy.  These societies, which are the 
focus of our discussion, have converged on the judgment that polygamous relationships should 
not be lawful in their majority cultures.  I cannot weigh in on the reasons for and against this 
judgment in this paper, but will simply note that polygamous marriages cannot be granted 
unification admissions status in these societies if they are not recognized between existing 
members.  Because each member can bring in at most one spouse, spousal unification will not 
give rise to an unmanageable increase in admissions under ordinary circumstances. 
 Second, to minimize fraudulent claims, societies can request official marriage licenses 
and interview purported spouses regarding the nature of their relationship.  Spouses typically 
also cohabitate, and this is something that the state can check on over time if there is reason to 
suspect that a fraudulent request for spousal unification has been made.  As with other 
unification admissions requests, a petition to bring in a non-member spouse is made by a 
member of society.  If reasons to suspect fraud emerge, for instance if many purported spouses 
are being petitioned over a few years by the same person, the member can be questioned and face 
substantial fines or even jail time if convicted of immigration-related marriage fraud.  The ability 
to verify, with some degree of reliability, the fact that two people are genuinely married is part of 
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what makes obligatory unification admissions status for spouses of members suitable for 
inclusion in a feasible immigration policy regime. 
 
6. Taking Stock 
 
 In summary, the ability to live near and care for their parents, to raise their children to 
adulthood, and to share their lives with their spouses are important to the lives of members of 
society.  Their lives may be significantly impacted for the worse by the inability to bring these 
persons into their society through immigration.  Given that it would be feasible to do so, societies 
should treat their parents, children, and spouses, properly specified, as obligatory unification 
admissions.  As argued above, giving obligatory unification admissions status to these non-
members will secure the fundamental interests of members in participating in and maintaining 
particularly close relationships with them.  One fundamental interest of persons is the interest in 
participating in and maintaining particularly close relationships with other persons.  As a 
generalization, relationships with our parents, children, and spouses are particularly close 
relationships, and ones where fulfilling this interest will often require being able to live in the 
same society as these persons.  These relationships are typically especially close ones and 
unification is important for participating in and maintaining them.  Further, parent-child and 
spousal relationships, as I have specified them, do not give rise to long chains of migration and 
can be verified with some degree of reliability.  Granting obligatory unification admissions status 
to parents, non-adult unmarried children, and spouses of members is compatible with a society 
having a feasible immigration policy regime that is able to meet its other immigration-related 
responsibilities. 
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7. Contrasts with Other Relationships 
 
 By contrast, the generalization that obligatory unification admissions status should be 
granted to siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, or grandparents of members seems 
implausible.  We may add adult children to this group, but I have already discussed why they 
should not be treated as obligatory unification admissions above.  What is different about these 
relationships?  As I’ve mentioned, in particular cases the relationships between members and 
these non-members may be especially close and important for them, to the point where the fact 
that they cannot unify will significantly impact their lives.  I concede that Ferracioli is entirely 
right about this.  Yet these cases are far more rare than cases where parent-child and spousal 
relationships, properly specified, are of this level of importance for the persons in them.  Because 
societies must implement general policies regarding non-members who they will take in and do 
so in a way that is compatible with meeting their other immigration-related responsibilities, they 
must grant obligatory unification admissions status in a way that captures the types of 
relationships for which unification is typically most pressing.  This is an important difference 
between the parent-child and spousal relationships discussed above and relationships with these 
other family members.  The former typically rise to the level of importance where the 
fundamental interests of members can be affected by unification policies, where this isn’t a 
plausible generalization about the latter.48 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 One way in which these other family relationships may be especially close is if some of these 
family members played the role of a parent in our lives.  As I argued above, the reasoning in 
favor of granting obligatory unification admissions status to parents of members extends to other 
persons who played this parental role.  This consideration doesn’t give us a reason, then, to treat 
relationships with siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, or grandparents as such on a 
par with parent-child and spousal relationships. 
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 As I’ve noted, some members of society may have fundamental interests in participating 
in and maintaining close relationships with these other family members, where these interests are 
set back by the inability to bring them in as new members.  My view accommodates this fact 
because it holds that when it is the case that granting unification admissions status to a category 
of immigrants would be infeasible for a society, appropriate consideration to these interests does 
not require the society to do so.  As I’ve argued, parent-child and spousal relationships, properly 
specified, require unification for the fundamental interests of members to be fulfilled far more 
often than do these other family relationships, which are typically less close and do not require 
unification to be maintained.  These parent-child and spousal relationships should therefore be 
the relationships that are granted obligatory unification admissions status when this status cannot 
feasibly be given to all relationships. 
 A straightforward extension of these points demonstrates that Ferracioli is also mistaken 
in concluding that we cannot justify leaving friends and creative partners out of the obligatory 
unification admissions category.  Once again, I concede that, on a case-by-case basis, it may be 
just as important for certain people to be able to bring in their friends or creative partners as it is 
for others to bring in their parents, children, or spouses.  It is far more rare, however, that 
friendships or creative partnerships involve fundamental interests of members that cannot be 
fulfilled unless certain persons are allowed to immigrate.  Friendships typically can be carried on 
abroad with sporadic visits, and many creative partnerships can be sustained digitally, as co-
authors in philosophy know well.  Given the requirements of feasibility, appropriate 
consideration to the fundamental interests of members who wish to bring in these other persons 
does not require granting them obligatory unification admissions status.   
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 Additionally, while my argument doesn’t rest on this point, there are important 
differences between the means that can be used to verify parent-child and spousal relationships 
as compared with friendships, and at least many creative partnerships.  With respect to the 
creative partnerships that Ferracioli has in mind, I will assume that these do not already fall 
under the category of persons that can be sponsored for work visas,49 since this would largely 
obviate the need to bring such persons in through the unification stream.50  The same contrast 
with respect to means of verification can also be made between other family members and the 
friends and creative partners of members of society, with the qualification just mentioned.51  In 
the case of family members, DNA tests52 and family legal records can be and are in fact used to 
determine the veracity of claims when suspicions arise.  With spouses, evidence of shared 
financial holdings, such as joint bank accounts, and cohabitation are often used as evidence of 
the relationship.  Of course, sham marriages are sometimes entered into for purposes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 A further point to note here is that some of the creative partnerships that Ferracioli has in 
mind, such as that of bandmates “Maddy and Oscar” from Madagascar who have been “working 
together for 20 years” (‘Family Migration Schemes and Liberal Neutrality: A Dilemma’, p. 570), 
could potentially make use of visas for musicians and other artists that many countries provide.  
Of course, receiving these visas can involve meeting somewhat demanding criteria.  In the 
United States, for instance, members of musical groups that work in a traditional or unique art 
form, or who are internationally renowned, can apply for a “P visa,” where “P” refers to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(P), Section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. 
50 Additionally, when two people have established an ongoing working relationship of the kind 
that could make a work visa sponsorship possible, there is generally substantial evidence of the 
relationship that can be provided and verified. 
51 I here drop the qualification that these creative partners do not qualify for work visas for ease 
of exposition. 
52 Countries that use DNA testing to verify family relationships in immigration include Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  For a helpful discussion of this practice, see Jackie Taitz, 
Jacqueline E.M. Weekers, and Davide T. Mosca, ‘The Last Resort: Exploring the Use of DNA 
Testing for Family Reunification’, Health and Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2002), pp. 20-32. 
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immigration.53  But in spousal and family admissions, these hard forms of evidence can be 
provided for verification purposes.  Of course, as with spouses and family members, immigration 
officials could use interviews and request various forms of evidence, such as past 
correspondence and photos,54 to try to ascertain whether people are close friends.  But no similar 
forms of hard evidence are generally available for verifying such friendships.  For creative 
partnerships that fall short of the kinds of working relationships that can make use of work visas, 
the same is true.  While I have argued that states do not have to grant obligatory unification 
admissions status to family members other than parents, non-adult unmarried children, and 
spouses, these other family relationships are not difficult or particularly costly to verify.  I cannot 
fully make the case in this paper, but this suggests that societies may be justified in treating these 
other family members as optional unification admissions, preferring them over general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 State immigration agencies sometimes exaggerate the prevalence of marriage-based 
immigration fraud, sometimes to great effect.  For instance, the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) claimed that 30 percent of marriage-based immigration was 
fraudulent in the congressional hearings on the Immigration and Marriage Fraud Amendments of 
1986 (IMFA).  This claim had a large effect on support for the IMFA in Congress.  Only limited 
hearing was given to testimony that questioned the claim, such as the statement given by Jules E. 
Coven, then President of the American Immigration Lawyers Association.  A later study cast 
doubt on the accuracy of the statistical claim made, finding that the denial rate for marriage-
based immigration was only 4.6 percent (see ‘INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims’, Interpreter 
Releases, No. 65, (1988), pp. 26-7).  While it’s possible that there was a gap between the rate at 
which marriage-based fraud was detected and the rate at which fraudulent claims were denied in 
the U.S., it is very unlikely that a difference of this magnitude could be explained in this way.  
See J.A. Tucker, “Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of Status and the 
Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes,” Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1989), pp. 20-
110.  For important criticisms of the effects of provisions in the IMFA and subsequent INS 
regulations that apply to women seeking to avoid deportation while separating from their citizen 
partners, see Uma Narayan, ‘“Male-Order” Brides: Immigrant Women, Domestic Violence and 
Immigration Law’, Hypatia, Vol. 10, No. 1, (Winter 1995), pp. 104-119.  
54 For a helpful overview of the kinds of questions that couples may be asked in their interviews 
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, see Ilona Bray, 
Fiancé and Marriage Visas: A Couple’s Guide to U.S. Immigration, 9th edition (Berkeley: Nolo, 
2016).  In addition to answering any number of factual questions about their relationship and 
providing past correspondence and photos, couples are often asked to show that they have 
matching house keys in their possession. 
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admissions, while not giving any official unification status to friends or creative partners.55  To 
monitor and verify friendships and creative partnerships with the same level of certainty that 
DNA tests, family legal records, joint financial holdings, and cohabitation provide would 
probably require immigration services to track people’s activities closely over time, which would 
be very costly.  While societies can reasonably determine whether people really stand in family 
or spousal relationships with their members using relatively inexpensive and easily applied 




 The traditional state sovereignty view on immigration has been thought to involve a 
commitment to a society’s responsibility to give preferential treatment to relatives and spouses 
seeking admission.  Ferracioli presents liberal theorists who agree that these non-members 
should be given preferential treatment with a dilemma.  According to Ferracioli, the requirement 
of liberal neutrality implies that societies should treat all or nearly all relationships between 
members and non-members on a par.  Hence, liberals are faced with the dilemma of having 
either to concede that a much wider array of relationships must be recognized by an immigration 
policy regime or give up the view that members have legitimate demands to bring in relatives 
and spouses.  I have shown that liberals can deny the first horn of this dilemma without relying 
on any substantive commitments of the traditional state sovereignty view, in particular the wide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify the fact that by granting 
optional unification admissions status to the additional family members mentioned here, refugee 
admissions will not be decreased, because refugees are an obligatory admissions category.  As I 
have defined them, optional unification admissions can be refused if there are too many 
immigrants from another category seeking to enter, such as refugees. 
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latitude that it ascribes to states in matters of immigration.  By contrast with alternatives that 
would rely on claims about intrinsic differences between relationships in terms of their moral 
significance or importance to justify treating them differently in immigration, my view retains a 
commitment to liberal neutrality.  The justification that I’ve given for distinguishing between 
different categories of unification admissions does not appeal to a particular conception of the 
good or comprehensive doctrine.  Rather, it appeals to the need to implement a feasible 
immigration policy regime while giving appropriate consideration to the fundamental interests of 
members in unifying with certain non-members that they are in particularly close relationships 
with.  My view does not claim that the non-members who should be granted obligatory 
unification admissions status are parties to intrinsically better or more important relationships 
with members than others.  It instead relies on the generalization that parent-child and spousal 
relationships, properly specified, are the ones that tend to require unification for the fundamental 
interests of members to be fulfilled.  Given that not all non-members in morally significant 
relationships with members can be granted obligatory unification admissions status, parents, 
non-adult unmarried children, and spouses of members are the ones to whom this status should 
be granted.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I would like to thank Christian Barry, Bob Goodin, Peter McDonald, Iddo Porat, James 
Raymer, and Peter Singer for comments and discussion on the points raised in this paper.  For 
written comments, I am especially grateful to Steve Darwall, Luara Ferracioli, Serene Khader, 
Josh Knobe, Tally Kritzman-Amir, RJ Leland, Emily McTernan, Daniel Putnam, Nic 
Southwood, and two anonymous reviewers for the journal. 
